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I    INTRODUCTION 
It is often said that Australia is a world leader in rates of copyright 
infringement for entertainment goods. In 2012, the hit television (‘TV’) show, 
Game of Thrones, was by some figures the most downloaded television show 
over BitTorrent, and estimates suggest that Australians accounted for a plurality 
of approximately 10 per cent of the 3–4 million downloads each week.1 The 
season finale of 2013 was downloaded over a million times within 24 hours of its 
release, and again Australians were apparently the largest block of illicit 
downloaders over BitTorrent, despite our relatively small population.2 This trend 
has led the former United States Ambassador to Australia to implore Australians 
to stop ‘stealing’ digital content, 3  and rightsholders to push for increasing 
sanctions on copyright infringers. The Australian Government is looking to 
respond by requiring Internet Service Providers (‘ISPs’) to issue warnings and 
potentially punish consumers who are alleged by industry groups to have 
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1  Ernesto, ‘Who’s Pirating Game of Thrones, and Why?’ on TorrentFreak (20 May 2012) 
<http://torrentfreak.com/whos-pirating-game-of-thrones-and-why-120520/>. 
2 Ernesto, ‘Games of Thrones Season Finale Sets New Piracy Record’ on TorrentFreak (10 June 2013) 
<http://torrentfreak.com/games-of-thrones-season-finale-sets-new-piracy-record-130610/>. 
3 Jeffrey Bleich, Stopping the Game of Clones (23 April 2013) Facebook <https://facebook.com/ 
 notes/ambassador-bleich/stopping-the-game-of-clones/542850132425361>. 
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infringed copyright.4 This is the logical next step in deterring infringement, given 
that the operators of infringing networks (like The Pirate Bay, for example) are 
out of regulatory reach. This steady ratcheting up of the strength of copyright, 
however, comes at a significant cost to user privacy and autonomy,5 and while 
the decentralisation of enforcement reduces costs, it also reduces the due process 
safeguards provided by the judicial process.6 
This article presents qualitative evidence that substantiates a common 
intuition: one of the major reasons that Australians seek out illicit downloads of 
content like Game of Thrones in such numbers is that it is more difficult to 
access legitimately in Australia.7 The geographically segmented way in which 
copyright is exploited at an international level has given rise to a ‘tyranny of 
digital distance’, where Australians have less access to copyright goods than 
consumers in other countries. 8  Compared to consumers in the United States 
(‘US’) and the European Union (‘EU’), Australians pay more for digital goods,9 
have less choice in distribution channels,10 are exposed to substantial delays in 
access,11 and are sometimes denied access completely.12 In this article we focus 
our analysis on premium film and television offerings, like Game of Thrones, and 
through semi-structured interviews, explore how choices in distribution impact 
on the willingness of Australian consumers to seek out infringing copies of 
copyright material. Game of Thrones provides an excellent case study through 
which to frame this analysis: it is both one of the least legally accessible 
                                                 
4 Attorney-General George Brandis, ‘A Practical Look at Copyright Reform Forum’ (Speech delivered at 
the Opening of the Australian Digital Alliance Fair Use for the Future, Canberra, 14 February 2014) 
<http://www.attorneygeneral.gov.au/Speeches/Pages/2014/First%20Quarter%202014/14February2014-
openingoftheAustralianDigitalAllianceForum.aspx>; see also Lexi Metherell, ‘Attorney-General George 
Brandis Considers Copyright Law Changes to Target Internet Piracy’ on ABC Online (15 February 2014) 
<http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-02-14/george-brandis-federal-government-to-target-internet-
piracy/5261404>. 
5  See Julie E Cohen, ‘Pervasively Distributed Copyright Enforcement’ (2006) 95 Georgetown Law Journal 
1, 39–41. 
6 See Nicolas Suzor and Brian Fitzgerald, ‘The Legitimacy of Graduated Response Schemes in Copyright 
Law’ (2011) 34 University of New South Wales Law Journal 1, 17. 
7 See Adam Turner, ‘Foxtel Game of Thrones Deal Blocks iTunes/Quickflix Fast-Tracking’ on 
Hydrapinion (19 April 2013) <http://www.hydrapinion.com/index.php/play/2013/04/19/foxtel-game-of-
thrones-deal>; John Birmingham, ‘Goodbye, Foxtel – Your Game of Thrones Stand Makes it Hodor to 
Stay’, The Sydney Morning Herald (online), 4 February 2014 <http://www.smh.com.au/comment/blogs/ 
 blunt-instrument/goodbye-foxtel--your-game-of-thrones-stand-makes-it-hodor-to-stay-20140203-
31xgw.html>. 
8   Tama Leaver, ‘Watching Battlestar Galactica in Australia and the Tyranny of Digital Distance’ (2008) 
126 Media International Australia, Incorporating Culture & Policy 145, 153. 
9      House of Representatives Standing Committee on Infrastructure and Communications, Parliament of 
Australia, At What Cost? IT Pricing and the Australia Tax (2013) 17–18 (‘IT Pricing Inquiry’). 
10      Angela Daly, ‘Aussies Are Still Paying over the Odds and It’s Time for ACCC Action’ on The 
Conversation (16 June 2014) <https://theconversation.com/aussies-are-still-paying-over-the-odds-and-its-
time-for-accc-action-27920>. 
11      Jordi McKenzie and W D Walls, ‘File-sharing and Film Revenues: An Empirical Analysis’ (Working 
Paper, School of Economics, The University of Sydney, 24 July 2013) 12–13. 
12    Josh Taylor, ‘Netflix’s Australian Block Keeps Quickflix Going’ on ZDNet (1 March 2013) 
<http://www.zdnet.com/au/netflixs-australian-block-keeps-quickflix-going-7000012006/>. 
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television offerings and one of the most downloaded through file-sharing 
networks of recent times. Our analysis shows that at the same time as 
rightsholder groups, particularly in the film and television industries, are 
lobbying for stronger laws to counter illicit distribution,13 the business practices 
of their member organisations are counterproductively increasing incentives for 
consumers to infringe. 
The lack of accessibility and high prices of copyright goods in Australia leads 
to substantial economic waste. The unmet consumer demand means that 
Australian consumers are harmed by lower access to information and 
entertainment goods than consumers in other jurisdictions. The higher rates of 
infringement that fulfils some of this unmet demand increases enforcement costs 
for copyright owners and imposes burdens either on our judicial system or on 
private entities – like ISPs – who may be tasked with enforcing the rights of third 
parties. Most worryingly, the lack of convenient and cheap legitimate digital 
distribution channels risks undermining public support for copyright law. Our 
research shows that consumers blame rightsholders for failing to meet market 
demand, and this encourages a social norm that infringing copyright, while 
illegal, is not morally wrongful. 
The implications are as simple as they are profound: Australia should not 
take steps to increase the strength of copyright law at this time, at least in relation 
to the film and television industries. The interests of the public and those of 
rightsholders align better when there is effective competition in distribution 
channels and consumers can legitimately get access to content. While foreign 
rightsholders are seeking enhanced protection for their interests, increasing 
enforcement is likely to increase their ability to engage in lucrative geographical 
price discrimination, particularly for premium content. This is only likely to 
increase the degree to which Australian consumers feel that their interests are not 
being met and, consequently, to further undermine the legitimacy of copyright 
law. If consumers are to respect copyright law, increasing sanctions for 
infringement without enhancing access and competition in legitimate distribution 
channels could be dangerously counterproductive. 14  We suggest that 
rightsholders’ best strategy for addressing infringement in Australia at this time 
is to ensure that Australians can access copyright goods in a timely, affordable, 
convenient, and fair lawful manner. 
 
                                                 
13     Josh Taylor, ‘Film Lobby Emails Detail Persistence for Copyright Crackdown’ on ZDNet (11 April 2014) 
<http://www.zdnet.com/film-lobby-emails-detail-persistence-for-copyright-crackdown-7000028324/>.  
14  Nicolas Suzor, ‘Free-riding, Cooperation, and “Peaceful Revolutions” in Copyright’ (2014) 28 Harvard 
Journal of Law & Technology 137. 
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II    THE TYRANNY OF DIGITAL DISTANCE 
Australia has long suffered from a ‘tyranny of distance’; 15  our remote 
location means that imported physical goods are necessarily more expensive and 
more difficult to access than in other countries. For physical copyright goods 
(books, music, films, recorded broadcasts, and computer software), parallel 
importation laws also increased prices for consumers. 16  These restrictions, 
designed to insulate local markets from competition from larger producers,17 also 
had the effect of prohibiting arbitrage and allowing a regime of regional pricing18 
that allowed copyright owners to charge Australian consumers higher prices for 
copyright works. 19  Because we are a relatively wealthy nation, with a high 
minimum20 and average21 wage, the distributors who have been able to limit 
arbitrage have often been able to increase prices in Australia relative to other 
countries.22 
It is commonly understood that removing restrictions on parallel importation 
increases national welfare by reducing the deadweight loss accruing from market 
segmentation and monopoly pricing, as well as transforming economic rents of 
foreign companies into domestic consumer surplus. 23  In its recent report 
recommending the repeal of parallel importation restrictions on books (the last 
remaining restrictions), the Productivity Commission summarised the effect of 
parallel importation restrictions as imposing ‘a private, implicit tax on Australian 
consumers which is used largely to subsidise foreign copyright holders.’ 24 
                                                 
15    Geoffrey Blainey, The Tyranny of Distance: How Distance Shaped Australia’s History (Sun Books, 
1966); see also Ann Capling and Kim Richard Nossal, ‘Death of Distance or Tyranny of Distance? The 
Internet, Deterritorialization, and the Anti-Globalization Movement in Australia’ (2001) 14 The Pacific 
Review 443, 449. 
16    Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Submission No 260 to Productivity Commission, 
Report on Copyright Restrictions on the Parallel Importation of Books, January 2009, 6–7. 
17    Mark J Davison, ‘Parallel Importing of Copyright Material in a Digital Age: Why It Should Be Lawful 
and Why It May Never Be’ (1997) 25 Federal Law Review 263, 270. 
18   Theo Papadopoulos, ‘The Economic Case against Copyright Owner Control over Parallel Imports’ (2003) 
6 Journal of World Intellectual Property 329, 353–4. 
19  Historically, Australia’s remoteness necessarily meant that imported IP goods were more expensive here 
than elsewhere: see IT Pricing Inquiry, above n 9, 3 [1.14]. 
20 Australian Industry Group, Submission to the Fair Work Commission, Annual Wage Review 2013–14, 28 
March 2014, 23; Damien Oliver and John Buchanan, ‘Australian Business Gets a Good Deal from the 
Minimum Wage’, The Conversation (11 June 2014) <http://theconversation.com/australian-business-gets-
a-good-deal-from-the-minimum-wage-27698>. 
21 Australian Industry Group, above n 20, 28–9. 
22 Papadopoulos, ‘The Economic Case against Copyright Owner Control over Parallel Imports’, above n 18, 
354. Fels and Walker note that ‘[d]ue to the import restrictions, publishers can set prices on the basis of 
what each market can bear rather than on the basis of the relative cost of supplying that market as would 
happen under competitive conditions’: Allan Fels and Jill Walker, ‘The Market for Books and the 
Importation Provisions of the Copyright Act 1968’ (1990) 17 Melbourne University Law Review 566, 
572–3. 
23    Theo Papadopoulos, ‘Copyright, Parallel Imports and National Welfare: The Australian Market for Sound 
Recordings’ (2000) 33 Australian Economic Review 337, 344. 
24  Productivity Commission, Restrictions on the Parallel Importation of Books (2009) xx–xxi. 
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Despite this recommendation and consumer criticism, 25  the restrictions on 
importing books have largely survived, partly as a protectionist measure to 
safeguard local publishers,26 who have expressed a fear that they will be unable 
to compete with larger international producers who bear reduced labour costs and 
benefit from larger economies of scale.27 The parallel importation restrictions on 
music, ebooks, computer software and periodicals, however, have all been 
lifted.28 
In the digital age, while the costs of delivering content to Australian 
consumers has fallen significantly, digital copyright goods remain substantially 
more expensive than in other countries.29 There appears to be a keen awareness 
in Australian society that Australians are paying significantly more for access to 
digital goods that are delivered by the same servers over the same network 
infrastructure that delivers orders to consumers in other jurisdictions. Control 
over digital distribution channels enables foreign rightsholders to maximise their 
profits through regional pricing, 30  just as parallel importation laws did for 
physical goods. 
This article examines the intersection of two increasingly prevalent themes 
surrounding access to copyright goods in Australia. On the one hand, there is a 
strong impression that copyright infringement is widespread and unsustainable, 
reinforced by the language of crisis used by industry lobbyists. On the other 
hand, Australian consumers are increasingly of the opinion that they are not 
being fairly treated by rightsholders. The disparity, colloquially known as the 
‘Australia Tax’, became particularly apparent with the rise of the Australian 
dollar against the greenback over the last decade. The recent IT Pricing Inquiry, a 
high profile inquiry by the Australian House of Representatives Standing 
Committee on Infrastructure and Communications, both reflected this perception 
of unfairness and fuelled it by providing national media coverage to the practices 
of rightsholders in providing access to Australian markets.31 Speaking generally, 
large foreign rightsholders and distributors were portrayed very poorly through 
the inquiry process – most notably, Apple, Microsoft, and Adobe were ultimately 
                                                 
25   See, eg, Darren Osborne, ‘Book Business Is Its Own Worst Enemy’ on ABC Online (21 February 2011) 
<http://www.abc.net.au/technology/articles/2011/02/21/3143909.htm>. 
26 Arlen Duke, ‘The Empire Will Strike Back: The Overlooked Dimension to the Parallel Import Debate’ 
(2014) 37 Melbourne University Law Review 585, 591; Lenore Taylor, ‘Labor Baulks at Book Reform’ 
The Australian (online), 12 November 2009 <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/archive/politics/labor-
baulks-at-book-reform/story-e6frgczf-1225796727872>. 
27 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, above n 16, 5–6. 
28   For sound recordings, see Copyright Amendment Act (No 2) 1998 (Cth) as recommended in Prices 
Surveillance Authority, Inquiry into the Prices of Sound Recordings (1990) 152–3; for computer software 
and electronic versions of books, periodicals and sheet music, see Copyright Amendment (Parallel 
Importation) Act 2003 (Cth), as recommended in Intellectual Property & Competition Review 
Committee, Review of Intellectual Property Legislation under the Competition Principles Agreement: 
Final Report (IP Australia, 2000) 72–3. 
29 IT Pricing Inquiry, above n 9, 18. 
30 Ibid 91–2 [4.23]–[4.26]. 
31 Ibid 18. 
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compelled to give evidence after refusing to appear in public hearings.32 When 
the inquiry was completed, the final report confirmed a commonly held belief: 
‘[i]n many cases prices are significantly higher than what might be expected as a 
consequence of any costs arising from delivery in the Australian market.’33 
This article explores the link between these two major themes. Our research 
examines the effect of the perceived failure of rightsholders and distributors to 
provide a fair deal for Australian consumers on the willingness of consumers to 
infringe. While a link between levels of access and infringement is often 
hypothesised and anecdotally discussed, this research provides a new qualitative 
exploration of how consumers justify copyright infringement and the substantial 
disconnect between rational, profit maximising market segmentation sanctioned 
by copyright law and the perceived fairness of those business practices. 
 
III    METHODOLOGY 
In order to provide a qualitative exploration of the willingness of Australian 
consumers to infringe copyright, Dootson conducted 29 face-to-face semi-
structured 34  in-depth interviews. 35  The interviews were designed to provide 
insight into how consumers justified questionable and unacceptable consumption 
behaviours. The respondents were selected using purposive snowball sampling, 
where participants referred other potential participants to the researcher. This 
purposive non-probability sampling technique was used to ensure a broad range 
of views were collected in an efficient and cost-effective manner.36 Respondents 
were then selected with respect to demographic criteria of age and gender, both 
of which have been found to influence perceptions of consumer behaviours.37 
The heterogeneity of the sample on these characteristics reflects differences in 
beliefs in the consumer marketplace. Only individuals living in Australia were 
allowed to participate, to ensure their views reflected the views found in an 
                                                 
32  Spandas Lui, ‘Apple, Microsoft, and Adobe Forced to Face IT Pricing Inquiry’ on ZDNet (11 February 
2013) <http://www.zdnet.com/au/apple-microsoft-and-adobe-forced-to-face-it-pricing-inquiry-
7000011103/>. 
33  IT Pricing Inquiry, above n 9, 3–4 [1.17]. 
34  Given the semi-structured nature of the interviews, all participants received the same questions from the 
interview guide, however, the probing and follow-up questions varied across respondents. A copy of the 
interview guide is available upon request. 
35 The interviews lasted an average of 50 minutes and were audio recorded to enable transcription. An 
interview guide was used to provide structure, and follow-up and probing questions were asked to enable 
the researcher to expand upon the predefined questions. See Herbert J Rubin and Irene S Rubin, 
Qualitative Interviewing: The Art of Hearing Data (SAGE Publications, 2nd ed, 2005) 67. 
36  William G Zikmund et al, Marketing Research (Cengage Learning, 2nd Asia Pacific ed, 2011). 
37 See, eg, Randy L Genereux and Beverly A McLeod, ‘Circumstances Surrounding Cheating: A 
Questionnaire Study of College Students’ (1995) 36 Research in Higher Education 687; Joan M 
McMahon and Ronnie Cohen, ‘Lost in Cyberspace: Ethical Decision Making in the Online Environment’ 
(2009) 11 Ethics and Information Technology 1; George P Moschis and Gilbert A Churchill Jr, 
‘Consumer Socialization: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis’ (1978) 15 Journal of Marketing 
Research 599. 
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Australian marketplace. As this is not a representative sample, future research 
would benefit from quantitatively assessing the qualitative findings presented in 
this article using a probability sampling technique to enable generalisability of 
the results. As the purpose of the research was to explore general perceptions of 
deviant consumer behaviours, there was no need to restrict the sample to 
individuals who had experience performing the behaviours being examined. 
Twenty nine Australian consumers were interviewed at which point 
theoretical saturation was reached, where no new information was presented.38 
Given the sensitive nature of the research topic, there was potential for social 
desirability bias, which was mitigated by guaranteeing informant anonymity and 
confidentiality.39 While the method may be limited by its inability to generalise 
the findings beyond the sample, our intention here is not to provide quantitative 
measures of incidence or prevalence, but instead to gather deep, vivid, and 
nuanced information that is ‘rich in thematic detail’. 40   A small sample is 
accordingly appropriate for this work. 41  Future research would benefit from 
conducting quantitative research to empirically examine the views of Australian 
consumers on willingness to infringe. 
 
Table 1: Sample Characteristics 
 
Age Males Females Total 
19–34 5 4 9 
35–50 4 5 9 
51–66 5 4 9
67+ 1 1 2
 15 14 29 
 
The interviews were designed to provide insight into how consumers justified 
questionable and unacceptable behaviours. The interviews included a card-sort 
activity, in which respondents were asked to sort a list of consumer behaviours 
into three pre-established categories: (1) acceptable behaviour, (2) questionable 
behaviour, and (3) unacceptable behaviour. Thirty consumer behaviours were 
chosen for the activity, two of which are relevant to this article: illegally 
                                                 
38 See Table 1 for sample characteristics. See also Anselm Strauss and Juliet Corbin, Basics of Qualitative 
Research: Techniques and Procedures for Developing Grounded Theory (SAGE Publications, 2nd ed, 
1998); Steinar Kvale, InterViews: An Introduction to Qualitative Research Interviewing (SAGE 
Publications, 1996); Jane Ritchie, ‘The Applications of Qualitative Methods to Social Research’ in Jane 
Ritchie and Jane Lewis (eds), Qualitative Research Practice: A Guide for Social Science Students and 
Researchers (SAGE Publications, 2003) 24. 
39 Lloyd C Harris, ‘Fraudulent Consumer Returns: Exploiting Retailers’ Return Policies’ (2010) 44 
European Journal of Marketing 730. Social desirability bias occurs when the respondent feels either 
consciously or unconsciously compelled to answer in a socially desirable way, thereby distorting the data: 
see Zikmund et al, above n 36. 
40  Rubin, above n 35, 129. 
41  Ritchie, above n 38. 
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downloading TV shows from the internet for free, for personal consumption; and 
creating a fake US iTunes account to access and pay for content not available in 
Australia. The card sort was conducted at the beginning of the session to 
facilitate the interview questions. Following the card sort activity, respondents 
discussed how they defined each of the behaviour categories – acceptable, 
questionable, and unacceptable. Respondents were then asked their opinions of 
the consumer behaviours under examination. Using a third person technique, 
respondents were asked to create arguments to encourage and deter ‘Sam’ from 
engaging in these consumer behaviours. This third person technique allowed the 
respondent to transfer his or her own attitudes towards the third person to explain 
that person’s behaviour. 42  The data was analysed through thematic analysis, 
which involves ‘identifying, analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within 
data’.43 The thematic analysis process involved coding, and re-coding data to 
identify overarching themes. Inductive and deductive coding techniques were 
used throughout the coding process to distinguish between existing ideas and 
new theoretical contributions.44 
Below, we discuss the results of this study in relation to the reasons 
underpinning consumer willingness to (1) illegally download TV shows from the 
internet for free, for personal consumption; and (2) create a fake US iTunes 
account to access and pay for content not available in Australia. The themes 
identified in the data include: the lack of legal alternatives, caused by delays in 
availability and geographic segmentation; the acceptability of circumventing 
restrictions in order to pay for access; perceptions of fairness in meeting 
consumer demand; the lack of identifiable harm caused by infringement; and the 
ineffectiveness of legal and social norms in providing deterrence. In order to 
illustrate the theoretical and qualitative analysis in this article, we present some 
quotes from participants in context below. These quotes are designed to be 
illustrative of the themes we identified, but we make no claim about the 
generalisable nature of these perspectives among the Australian population. We 
have chosen to focus particularly on the business practices of the foreign 
(primarily US) film and television industries, and note that practices in digital 
music, software, games, books, and other markets are markedly different – and in 
some of these markets, Australian consumers are much better served. Broadening 
out the analysis to consider the generalisable nature of the results to other 
copyright industries would be interesting, but must be left for future research. 
 
                                                 
42  Zikmund et al, above n 36. 
43 Virginia Braun and Victoria Clarke, ‘Using Thematic Analysis in Psychology’ (2006) 3 Qualitative 
Research in Psychology 77, 79. 
44 Johnny Saldaña, The Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers (SAGE Publications, 2009) 47–51. 
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IV    INACCESSIBILITY OF CONTENT AND PERCEIVED LACK 
OF BEHAVIOURAL ALTERNATIVES 
One of the strongest motivations for infringement is the lack of availability of 
digital content. In the Australian arm of the World Internet Project, Ewing and 
Thomas asked Australian internet users why they used file sharing services. 
Nearly two thirds of users surveyed rated ‘accessing hard to get content’ as 
playing an ‘important’ or ‘very important’ role in their decision to use file 
sharing services.45 Our research provides qualitative support for this proposition 
and illustrates how many consumers justify circumventing access restrictions or 
illicitly downloading content as a legitimate response to the perceived failure of 
rightsholders to meet market demand. 
Digital distribution systems in Australia have improved in recent years, but 
some content is still unavailable in this market. Australian consumers also 
complain about both the timeliness and convenience of Australian digital 
distribution channels. While Australians can access iTunes, for example, the 
range of television and film offerings is substantially smaller and more expensive 
than for US consumers.46 Historically, television programs, films, and computer 
games have often been released several months later in Australia compared to 
other jurisdictions,47 and Australians often have to wait for physical DVD or 
BluRay releases rather than being able to download films or television series. 
Streaming services48 for television and film content are a striking example of 
the disparity between levels of access in Australia and the US Netflix, a provider 
of on demand media streaming in the US, offers access to over 100 000 titles and 
is widely considered the ‘crown jewel’ in the competitive market for streaming of 
content.49  Netflix now accounts for up to a third of prime time downstream 
internet traffic,50 demonstrating a level of access and market penetration that far 
outstrips what is (legitimately) available to consumers in Australia. Australia’s 
                                                 
45 Accessing free content was the most highly nominated factor and was rated as ‘very important’ or 
‘important’ by 78 per cent of respondents: Scott Ewing and Julian Thomas, ‘CCi Digital Futures 2012: 
The Internet in Australia’ (Report, ARC Centre of Excellence for Creative Industries and Innovation, 11 
September 2012) 33.  
46 See Clancy Yeates, ‘Why Australian Shoppers Pay More’, The Sydney Morning Herald (online), 13 July 
2012 <http://www.smh.com.au/business/why-australian-shoppers-pay-more-20120713-2208v.html>; 
Annabel Hepworth, ‘We’re Paying 39pc More for Downloads’, The Australian (online), 12 June 2014 
<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/were-paying-39pc-more-for-downloads/story-e6frg8zx-
1226951246207#>. 
47 Leaver, above n 8, 151–2; Stefan Larsson et al, ‘Parallel Norms: File-Sharing and Contemporary 
Copyright Development in Australia’ (2014) 17 Journal of World Intellectual Property 1, 3. 
48  Streaming services typically provide access to a broad range of content for a flat regular fee, but 
consumers must pay each month to maintain access, as opposed to one-off purchases on physical media 
or via digital downloads. 
49   Jasmine Braxton, ‘Lost in Translation: The Obstacles of Streaming Digital Media and the Future of 
Transnational Licensing’ (2014) 36 Hastings Communication and Entertainment Journal 193, 202. 
50 Todd Spangler, ‘Netflix Remains King of Bandwidth Usage, While YouTube Declines’ on Variety (14 
May 2014) <http://variety.com/2014/digital/news/netflix-youtube-bandwidth-usage-1201179643/>. See 
also Steinar Ellingsen, ‘Seismic Shifts: Platforms, Content Creators and Spreadable Media’ (2014) 150 
Media International Australia, Incorporating Culture & Policy 106, 107. 
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largest streaming service, 51 Quickflix, offers a comparatively small library of 
around 60 000 titles and, crucially, is missing many of the high demand 
blockbuster titles that attract consumers. 52  Part of the explanation is that 
copyrights have historically been fragmented along geographical lines, and 
foreign firms are not able to easily secure the rights to stream to Australian 
consumers. 53  Australian distributors, on the other hand, do not have the 
economies of scale that allow them to overcome the high transaction costs of 
licensing foreign content for digital distribution in Australia.54 
Consumers in the US also benefit from significantly increased competition in 
digital distribution. Apart from Netflix, US consumers can access services such 
as Hulu (to stream television content); iTunes and Google Play (to rent or 
purchase television series and films); Amazon Prime (streaming and 
purchasing), 55  as well as offerings from individual television networks and 
production companies.56 As a result, US consumers have much greater choice in 
the formats and price points at which they can access entertainment goods. 
When rightsholders do not provide legitimate means of accessing content, we 
expect consumers to seek out alternate methods of obtaining access. Here we see 
an important disconnect between the business practices of copyright industries 
and the law. The legal proposition, of course, is that copyright is a property right, 
and the law generally57 upholds the ability of rightsholders to make decisions 
about whether or not to sell access into any given market. Our research shows 
how consumers, however, may not accept this as a morally legitimate decision, 
regardless of its legality: ‘I think it [illegal downloading] becomes acceptable if 
you can’t get it anywhere. If there’s no other option available to you then [sic] 
                                                 
51    Other services include film rental over iTunes and Bigpond Movies, as well as Foxtel’s new streaming 
service, Presto: see Adam Turner, ‘IPTV State of the Nation: Where does Foxtel’s Presto Fit into the Big 
Picture?’ on Business Spectator (25 March 2014) <http://www.businessspectator.com.au/article/2014/ 
 3/25/technology/iptv-state-nation-where-does-foxtels-presto-fit-big-picture>. 
52 See, eg, Leigh Haugh, ‘Netflix: New Viewing Options Available for Streaming in June 2014’ on Liberty 
Voice (11 June 2014) <http://guardianlv.com/2014/06/netflix-new-viewing-options-available-for-
streaming-in-june-2014/>. 
53 ‘It is impossible to replicate the US Netflix offer here … many of the content rights are not available due 
to exclusivity deals’: Scott Lorson, CEO of FetchTV, quoted in Matthew Smith, ‘Lagging Behind: Why 
Quickflix Isn’t Doing a Netflix’, Business Review Weekly (online), 1 August 2013 
<http://www.brw.com.au/p/business/lagging_behind_why_quickflix_isn_ikkkciSC0eltJ4NN01079O>. 
See also Leaver, above n 8. 
54    Taylor, above n 12; IT Pricing Inquiry, above n 9, 54–6 [3.13]–[3.14], [3.20]. 
55 Christina Warren, ‘5 of the Best Streaming Media Services Compared’ on Mashable (14 Feb 2011) 
<http://mashable.com/2011/02/14/streaming-media-comparison/>, cited in Dan Garon, ‘Poison ivi: 
Compulsory Licensing and the Future of Internet Television’ (2014) 39 Journal of Corporation Law 173, 
193. See also Braxton, above n 49, 194–5, discussing the ‘piecemeal’ delivery of streaming services like 
Pandora, Spotify, Hulu, and Netflix. 
56   Ryland Sherman and David Waterman, ‘Technology and Competition in US Television: Online versus 
Offline’ in Yu-li Liu and Robert G Picard (eds), Policy and Marketing Strategies for Digital Media 
(Taylor & Francis, 2014) 265, 268–70. 
57    Subject to statutory licences for particular types of use and fair dealing and other limitations and 
exceptions. 
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illegally downloading it, why should you not be able to see the show because 
they haven’t made it available?’ (#4) 
In part, this can likely be explained as a reaction to the widespread perception 
that copyright industries have not reacted quickly enough to meet demand for 
digital distribution.58 Napster made consumers aware of the great potential of 
digital distribution for music – cheap (indeed, free), convenient access to an 
almost unlimited diversity of recorded music.59 The music industry responded 
largely by trying to protect its physical distribution channels, engaging in a long 
series of litigation, education campaigns, and lobbying.60 It wasn’t until Apple, 
an external actor, entered and disrupted the market with iTunes that the music 
industry became serious about meeting consumer demand through legitimate 
channels.61 The film industry, having had the opportunity to observe what was 
happening to music first, was even slower to respond. As Cunningham et al noted 
in 2010, the major corporations of Hollywood’s film industry ‘spent the best part 
of the last decade (a decade of experimentation and innovation) putting more 
energy into denial, threat and attempted litigation’.62 
Change has been slower in Australia, primarily because our smaller market 
makes it comparatively more costly to develop infrastructure and overcome the 
high transaction costs of securing digital distribution rights. This inability to fulfil 
consumer demand in the Australian market may be a significant contributing 
factor in the willingness of Australians to infringe. The respondents in our 
research were aware that US consumers are able to enjoy a much greater degree 
of access, and they blamed the industry for failing to keep up: ‘[s]o I just think if 
they’re not willing to keep up with the times, and they want to hold us to ransom, 
you know, then no, I don’t feel any guilt [for illegally downloading].’ (#12) By 
blaming the rightsholders and distributors in this way, consumers are able to deny their 
responsibility for any resulting infringement.63 In the sections that follow, we explore 
how the marketing strategies of the film and television industries increase the 
                                                 
58   Yu argues that ‘enforcement problems will surface if the entertainment industry fails to meet consumer 
demand’: Peter K Yu, ‘Digital Copyright and Confuzzling Rhetoric’ (2010) 13 Vanderbilt Journal of 
Entertainment and Technology Law 881, 935–7. 
59  ‘Many consumers seem to expect access to digital copies of any individual portion of content they desire 
at any time. This digital buffet runs counter to the traditional business models of most content providers, 
which make money primarily by aggregating and distributing the creative output of others. This conflict 
provides fertile ground for infringement. Consumers who want access to disaggregated content may 
resort to self-help if the “legitimate” market fails to produce a solution’: David W Opderbeck, ‘Peer-to-
Peer Networks, Technological Evolution, and Intellectual Property Reverse Private Attorney General 
Litigation’ (2005) 20 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 1685, 1730. 
60   See Patrik Wikström, The Music Industry: Music in the Cloud (Polity, 2009) 152–6. 
61   Wikström noted that while Apple launched the iTunes Music Store in 2003, it was only particularly 
challenged in 2007. By January 2008, music sales on iTunes still ‘constituted more than 70 per cent of the 
global legal online music market’: Wikström, above n 60, 101–3. 
62  Stuart Cunningham, Jon Silver and John McDonnell, ‘Rates of Change: Online Distribution as Disruptive 
Technology in the Film Industry’ (2010) 136 Media International Australia, Incorporating Culture & 
Policy 119, 125. 
63  The arguments for retaliating against consumption constraints can be explained by the neutralisation 
technique ‘denial of responsibility’: see Gresham M Sykes and David Matza, ‘Techniques of 
Neutralization: A Theory of Delinquency’ (1957) 22 American Sociological Review 664, 667. 
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willingness of consumers to infringe and how consumers rank paying for access 
as morally preferable to infringing. 
 
 A    ‘Cultural Buzz’ and Consumer Demand 
Game of Thrones provides an excellent case study through which to examine 
the conflict around distribution and copyright infringement. There has been a 
great deal of discussion around the apparent fact that Game of Thrones was the 
most downloaded television show on BitTorrent in 2012, and that Australians 
were the largest block of illegitimate downloaders.64 Rhetorically, the image of 
Australians as unrepentant pirates has lent political weight to current proposals to 
develop new schemes to limit copyright infringement.65 Importantly, however, 
Australian consumers face significant barriers in accessing Game of Thrones. 
HBO, the producer of Game of Thrones, restricts user access in Australia through 
an exclusive deal with Foxtel, a premium cable provider. 66   An Australian 
consumer who only wants to watch Game of Thrones (and not other bundled 
content) must pay $74 per month, with a minimum subscription term of six 
months, to watch it on Foxtel cable television.67 Alternatively, Foxtel offers a 
streaming service, Foxtel Play, for $45 per month.68 This is in stark contrast to 
other television shows, which are typically available not only through cable, but 
also for purchase as digital downloads for $3–4 per episode (or $29–39 per 
season) through Amazon, iTunes, and Google Play.69  In 2014, viewers who 
either did not subscribe to Foxtel or preferred to purchase episodes that they 
could keep, rather than paying a regular subscription fee, had to wait until the 
series had finished in order to view it on Quickflix or Google Play,70 or several 
months for the DVD or  BluRay release date or through iTunes.71 
                                                 
64 Ernesto, ‘Who’s Pirating Game of Thrones, and Why?’, above n 1; Lee Taylor, ‘Australians Named 
Worst Game of Thrones Pirates’, News.com.au, 21 May 2012 <http://www.news.com.au/technology/ 
 australians-named-worst-offenders-for-illegally-download-game-of-thrones/story-e6frfro0-
1226362158184>. 
65  See, eg, James Law, ‘Online Copyright Infringement Forum: Can Anything Stop Our Nation of Pirates?’, 
News.com.au, 10 September 2014, <http://www.news.com.au/technology/online/online-copyright-
infringement-forum-can-anything-stop-our-nation-of-pirates/story-fnjwneld-1227054171162>; Attorney-
General’s Department and Department of Communications, ‘Online Copyright Infringement’ (Discussion 
Paper, July 2014).  
66    Adam Harvey, ‘Game of Thrones Piracy War: Choice Says Foxtel Has Itself to Blame for Illegal 
Downloading of Hit Show’ on ABC Online (18 June 2014) <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-06-
17/choice-backs-australians-who-pirate-game-of-thrones/5530710>. 
67 Ernesto, ‘Why People Pirate Game of Thrones, a Global Cost Breakdown’ on TorrentFreak (13 April 
2014) <http://torrentfreak.com/why-people-pirate-game-of-thrones-a-global-cost-breakdown-140413/>. 
68 Foxtel, Foxtel Play (2014) <https://www.foxtel.com.au/foxtelplay/home/default.htm>. 
69    Warren, above n 55.  
70  Adam Turner, ‘Are You Ready to Binge on Game of Thrones?’ The Sydney Morning Herald (online), 16 
June 2014 <http://www.smh.com.au/digital-life/computers/gadgets-on-the-go/are-you-ready-to-binge-on-
game-of-thrones-20140616-zs8o1.html>. 
71  Adam Turner, ‘Why Isn’t Game of Thrones on Apple’s iTunes?’ The Sydney Morning Herald (online), 
18 June 2014 <http://www.smh.com.au/digital-life/computers/gadgets-on-the-go/why-isnt-game-of-
thrones-on-apples-itunes-20140618-zsd96.html>. 
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HBO and Foxtel’s distribution strategy focuses on lucrative premium 
subscriptions. Faced with the threat of increasing competition by Netflix and 
iTunes, HBO’s strategy with its premium content like Game of Thrones has been 
to restrict access to drive up demand for its own channels.72 Even in the US, the 
most recent episodes of Game of Thrones are only available online via the HBO 
GO streaming service73 which also requires the subscriber to be paying for cable 
service.74  The key difference is that in the US, a much larger proportion of 
consumers subscribe to cable television.75 By choosing to focus on the premium 
end of the market, rightsholders often choose to exclude a large proportion of 
consumers. 76  Exclusive deals might encourage more people to subscribe to 
premium cable or streaming services, but they are also likely to encourage more 
people to infringe. This point reflects a fundamental disconnect between the way 
in which copyright industry executives talk about business model strategies and 
the attitudes of consumers. Foxtel executive Bruce Meagher has dismissed 
consumer concerns about fairness of the distribution method for Game of 
                                                 
72    Todd Spangler, ‘Why HBO Is Keeping “Game of Thrones”, Other Shows Out of Amazon’s Hands’ on 
Variety (23 April 2014) <http://variety.com/2014/digital/news/why-hbo-is-keeping-game-of-thrones-
other-shows-out-of-amazons-hands-1201161978/>; Paul Tassi, ‘“Game of Thrones” Sets Piracy World 
Record, but Does HBO Care?’, on Forbes (15 April 2014) 
<http://www.forbes.com/sites/insertcoin/2014/04/15/game-of-thrones-sets-piracy-world-record-but-does-
hbo-care/>. Liedtke states: ‘No matter how much Netflix Inc is willing to pay for the rights, some online 
video remains off-limits. Major movie studios are refusing to license the rights to most of their latest 
movies at the same time they’re released on DVDs. Premium cable channels such as HBO and Showtime 
also are withholding their most popular series, including “Game of Thrones” and “Dexter”, because they 
are worried about losing subscribers if the content is available on Netflix’s less expensive Internet 
service’: Michael Liedtke, ‘Gaps in Netflix’s Online Library Likely to Persist’ on Yahoo Finance (9 April 
2012) <http://finance.yahoo.com/news/gaps-netflixs-online-library-likely-200620240.html>. 
73  HBO GO continues to experience some technical difficulties that have angered consumers. Most 
prominently, the streaming service has crashed several times under peak demand when viewers tune in 
for premium releases: see Dorothy Pomerantz, ‘Why It Matters That HBO Go Crashed Again During 
“Game of Thrones”’ on Forbes (4 July 2014) <http://www.forbes.com/sites/dorothypomerantz/ 
 2014/04/07/why-it-matters-that-hbo-go-crashed-again-during-game-of-thrones/>. 
74    Edmund Lee, ‘HBO’s Amazon Deal Without “Thrones” Shows Cable Loyalty’ on Bloomberg (24 April 
2014) <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-04-23/hbo-s-amazon-deal-without-thrones-shows-cable-
loyalty.html>. Abbruzzese notes that ‘[f]or people who do not want to pay for cable but want access to 
the company’s content, HBO Go became a flashpoint. Fans wanted to be able to pay for its digital 
offering, but HBO doesn’t allow consumers to access its content without a cable subscription’: Jason 
Abbruzzese, ‘HBO Has Only Itself to Blame for Streaming Struggles’ on Mashable (8 April 2014) 
<http://mashable.com/2014/04/07/hbo-go-streaming-failure/>. 
75    The USA has four times as many cable television subscribers per capita: Media>Cable TV Subscribers: 
Countries Compared (2014) NationMaster <http://www.nationmaster.com/country-
info/stats/Media/Cable-TV-subscribers>. See also Garon, above n 55, 174.  
76  Boyle discusses ‘an underlying problem’ inherent in price discrimination, and quotes Dupuit who notes 
that ‘[w]hat the company is trying to do is prevent the passengers who can pay the second-class fare from 
traveling third class; it hits the poor, not because it wants to hurt them, but to frighten the rich’: James 
Boyle, ‘Cruel, Mean, Or Lavish – Economic Analysis, Price Discrimination and Digital Intellectual 
Property’ (2000) 53 Vanderbilt Law Review 2007, 2024, quoting Jules Dupuit, ‘On Tolls and Transport 
Charges’ in Alan T Peacock (ed), International Economic Papers No 11 (E Henderson trans, Macmillan, 
1962) 7, 23. 
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Thrones as ‘absurd’. Meagher argues that with the streaming service offered by 
Foxtel Play: 
What we are left with is an argument at the margins about a few dollars. Yet some 
people still feel that they should be entitled to take this show for free without the 
consent of its creators rather than pay a reasonable price for an extraordinary 
product.77 
Our research highlights the basic finding that many consumers may not view 
questions of distribution and pricing as ‘an argument at the margins about a few 
dollars’. Rather, restricted distribution models appear to be central to the 
willingness of consumers to seek out infringing copies. There is some concept of 
fairness that pervades consumer expectations, and this concept is reflected 
strongly in both the political discourse around issues like the IT Pricing Inquiry 
and copyright reform, and also in our data. It is not necessarily clear what 
‘fairness’ means, but there is a strong disconnect between the way that industry 
representatives talk about fairness in terms of consumers refraining from stealing 
and the way that consumers talk about fairness in terms of rightsholders offering 
access on reasonable terms. Importantly, the experience of consumers is about 
much more than just price; while the price of access in Australia is significantly 
higher, other factors cannot easily be separated out. One of our respondents 
articulates how their concerns are about not just price, but also accessibility: 
Well again, for me that’s, there’s a fairness thing there. I don’t understand why, 
um, content isn’t available in Australia from Apple and from that perspective I’m 
sort of thinking well hang on, why are we being treated unfairly by Apple. We 
should have access to that just like at the moment why are we paying exorbitant 
prices for goods when our dollar is better than the United States and it happens to 
be cheaper over there, like significantly cheaper. I don’t quite get that so it’s sort 
of pretty much in the same vein there. So I’m not 100 per cent comfortable 
accepting it [illegal downloading]. I’m not saying it’s totally unacceptable. For me 
it’s a questionable action. (#11) 
A consistent frustration for consumers in Australia is that when media is 
available through legitimate channels, it is often delayed. For extremely popular 
media events, it is often suggested that a delay of even one or two days between 
the time a television show, book, or movie is available elsewhere and in Australia 
leads people to infringe.78 For example, taking 168 movies from the top 100 
films79 of 2013 and 2014 that were available in the US, 107 were released later in 
                                                 
77 Bruce Meagher, ‘Piracy: At Least the Lannisters Pay Their Debts’ on mUmBRELLA (10 April 2014) 
<http://mumbrella.com.au/piracy-least-lannisters-pay-debts-219984>. 
78  ‘There are few shows that hold so much appeal to both a niche nerdom and a much broader audience – 
we’re talking brilliantly-written high fantasy here peppered with sex and violence – and these fans want 
to join in on the conversation as soon as it starts; with their friends, with other fans, on forums, in 
comment sections and on social media. A delay, even a 48-hour one, prevents Australians from doing 
that. And that’s a problem’: Lucy O’Brien, quoted in Claire Porter, ‘Games of Clones: The Battle to 
Thwart Thrones Pirates’ on News.com.au (2 April 2013) <http://www.news.com.au/technology/biztech/ 
 games-of-clones-the-battle-to-thwart-thrones-pirates/story-fn5lic6c-1226610889872>. 
79  Measured by Australian Box Office takings. 
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Australia than the US, with an average delay of 20 days.80 In 2012, Game of 
Thrones was available on iTunes and Foxtel at least a week after they aired in the 
US. 81  As noted above, while the most recent series was available almost 
immediately on Foxtel, it was not available for several months to non-
subscribers. This delay in access can lead to a feeling that Australians are being 
unfairly left out in comparison with US and EU audiences, as articulated by a 
respondent: 
I can understand why people actually do illegally download TV shows and movies 
and all that sort of stuff because you know, depending on the distribution they can 
not come out for weeks, sometimes months … which is a very long time to wait, 
too much for our generation, sometimes even a year for some of the stuff to come 
out in Australia, which I think is really annoying. (#16) 
Importantly, the link between engagement and willingness of consumers to 
infringe is not lost on some parts of the entertainment industries. Recently, for 
example, the Director of Game of Thrones dismissed concerns that Australians 
have high rates of infringement on the basis that these series depend on ‘cultural 
buzz’ – the discussion generated and fed by viewers, both legitimate and 
infringing, was ‘how they survive’.82 The entertainment industries have become 
adept at encouraging this ‘cultural buzz’ in order to drive up demand for their 
premium offerings. Film and television has always been a social experience, but 
the new media environment allows producers to better exploit the connections 
between their viewers to increase audience loyalty.83 The convergence of media 
enables producers to use multiple channels, including social media, to engage 
audiences in a much more sophisticated manner than was possible with broadcast 
media. Extensive marketing campaigns turn entertainment goods into media 
events, combining saturating coverage in mainstream media with carefully 
curated extra content (like ‘webisodes’) and interactive experiences such as direct 
engagement with production staff and actors through social media. 84  The 
cumulative effect of these strategies is often to enable audiences to feel much 
more closely connected to media experiences and franchises. Engaged audiences 
are more loyal, and therefore more profitable, but they are also a key vector for 
                                                 
80  Nick Evershed, ‘Australian Film Industry Claims Delayed Release Is Rare but Data Shows Otherwise’, 
The Guardian (online), 30 June 2014 <http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2014/jun/30/ 
 australian-delayed-release-18-days>. 
81  Renai LeMay, ‘Australia Top Game of Thrones Pirating Nation’ on Delimiter (22 May 2012) 
<http://delimiter.com.au/2012/05/22/australia-top-game-of-thrones-pirating-nation/>. 
82 ‘Downloads Don’t Matter: Game of Thrones Director Says “Cultural Buzz” More Important than Ratings 
for Survival’, Sydney Morning Herald (online), 26 February 2013 <http://www.smh.com.au/ 
 entertainment/tv-and-radio/downloads-dont-matter-20130226-2f36r.html#ixzz2LywE7AZ2>. 
83   Henry Jenkins, Convergence Culture: Where Old and New Media Collide (New York University Press, 
2008) (discussing American Idol). 
84   Leaver discusses the buzz created around the Doctor Who and Battlestar Galactica television series: 
Leaver, above n 8, 148–50. Glater quotes Craig Engler, general manager of SciFi.com, who says that 
‘[t]his is a way to get people talking about the show a month before it airs’: Craig Engler, quoted in 
Jonathan Glater, ‘Sci Fi Creates “Webisodes” to Lure Viewers to TV’, New York Times (online), 5 
September 2006 <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/05/arts/television/05gala.html?_r=0>. 
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building new audiences85 and converting even more casual viewers into loyal 
fans.86 
The effect of social conversations around media events in driving up demand 
should not be underestimated. Australians may regularly form the largest block 
of downloaders of Game of Thrones, but this must be seen in the context of the 
massive hype around the series. Given the pervasive discussion that saturates 
social media after every episode, any loyal viewer of the series who wants to 
either participate or avoid spoilers is left with little choice but to pay for premium 
cable offerings or download the show.87 Those who do not are left out of the 
global discussion – for the most massive events or for releases with a particularly 
loyal cult following, even a matter of hours can be too late to join the live 
discussion or avoid spoilers. Because these conversations are not constrained by 
regional borders, global marketing campaigns often have the effect of driving up 
demand for Australian consumers long before the material is legitimately 
available. In these circumstances, consumers could feel justified in obtaining the 
content through illicit channels. This ‘cultural buzz’ feeds directly into the 
acceptability of using illicit means to access content, creating a self-reinforcing 
norm as peers are strongly motivated to participate in the conversations around 
them: ‘[d]ownload TV shows from the internet and then … you talk to your 
friends about the latest shows you should get, you know, and if you’re all talking 
about it then you’re all doing it then clearly it’s acceptable.’ (#8) 
Viewed as a marketing strategy, encouraging social buzz, even if it increases 
infringement, can be highly beneficial. Producers are increasingly dependent 
upon a loyal audience, and a sophisticated campaign of engagement is able to 
turn ‘casuals’ into much higher value ‘loyals’. 88  The infringement that 
accompanies cultural buzz and unmet consumer demand may not always harm 
sales of content when it is actually made available. Some content producers 
explicitly acknowledge the role that infringement has in growing audiences, 
building loyalty and increasing paid subscriptions. For example, when asked 
about users sharing passwords to access the HBO GO streaming service, the 
CEO of HBO Richard Plepler said that it had ‘no impact on the business’, 
explaining that HBO was ‘in the business of creating addicts’.89 Similarly, the 
CEO of Time Warner (which owns HBO), also dismissed the impact of 
audiences illegally downloading Game of Thrones: 
We’ve been dealing with this for 20, 30 years – people sharing subs, running wires 
                                                 
85  See Henry Jenkins, Sam Ford and Joshua Green, Spreadable Media: Creating Value and Meaning in a 
Networked Culture (New York University Press, 2013), 194–5. 
86   Leaver, above n 8, 146; Jenkins, above n 83, 76. 
87  ‘With many shared moments of fandom occurring via social media sites such as Twitter, Tumblr, and 
Facebook, the viewer runs the risk of being spoiled if they are even hours late in engaging’: Mark 
Stewart, ‘This Content Is Currently Unavailable: The Tyranny of Digital Distance, Updated’ (2014) 20 
Flow <http://flowtv.org/2014/07/this-content-is-currently-unavailable/>. 
88   Jenkins, above n 83, 76. 
89  Matthew Lynley, ‘HBO’s CEO Doesn’t Care That You Are Sharing Your HBO Go Password’ on 
BuzzFeed (7 January 2014) <http://www.buzzfeed.com/mattlynley/hbos-ceo-doesnt-care-that-you-are-
sharing-your-hbo-password>. 
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down the backs of apartment buildings. Our experience is that it leads to more 
paying subs. I think you’re right that Game of Thrones is the most pirated show in 
the world. … That’s better than an Emmy.90 
Engaged fans often make up a significant proportion of downloaders and 
likely often have a positive effect. These fans are audiences that are not seeking 
to avoid paying, but rather seeking to change the conditions upon which they can 
access the content.91 These are the fans that not only buy the DVD boxed sets and 
limited edition merchandise, they are also responsible for spreading awareness 
and building the audience for the franchise amongst their own social networks.92 
By managing and designing for cultural buzz, the copyright industries have 
been able to deliberately drive up demand for their offerings. Increasingly, they 
appear to do this with the full knowledge that increasing demand without making 
material more accessible will also increase infringement. Despite massive 
numbers of infringing viewers, for example, Game of Thrones has been HBO’s 
most profitable series in recent years. This has led HBO’s programming 
manager, Michael Lombardo, to also dismiss concerns about rates of 
infringement: 
I probably shouldn’t be saying this, but it is a compliment of sorts. … The demand 
is there. And it certainly didn’t negatively impact the DVD sales. [Piracy is] 
something that comes along with having a wildly successful show on a 
subscription network.93 
This reflects a deliberate and sophisticated strategy of engagement, and it is 
not even clear that reducing infringement, to the extent that doing so would also 
reduce the ability of fans to engage new audiences and new audiences to become 
fans, would increase the profitability of entertainment franchises. 
 
B    Conflicting Messages 
While some sectors of the entertainment industries embrace or at least tacitly 
accept infringement, this is not reflected in the rhetoric of lobbyists and the legal 
arms of entertainment conglomerates. Faced with complaints from consumers 
who feel unfairly treated, the response from rightsholders continues to revolve 
around the basic claim that consumers have no ‘entitlement’94 to ‘steal’95 content 
if they are not prepared to access it on the terms presented to them. In dismissing 
the justifications of Australians to obtain Game of Thrones through BitTorrent 
rather than subscribing to Foxtel, for example, Foxtel’s Bruce Meagher argues 
                                                 
90  Sam Thielman, ‘Bewkes: Game of Thrones Piracy “Better Than an Emmy”’ on AdWeek (7 August 2013) 
<http://www.adweek.com/news/television/bewkes-game-thrones-piracy-better-emmy-151738>. 
91  Jenkins, Ford and Green, above n 85, 113–14, citing Abigail De Kosnik, ‘Piracy Is the Future of 
Television’ (Research Paper, Convergence Culture Consortium, 17 March 2010). 
92  Jenkins, Ford and Green, above n 85, 114–15. 
93 Michael Lombardo, quoted in James Hibberd, ‘HBO: “Game of Thrones” Piracy Is a Compliment’ on 
Entertainment Weekly (31 March 2013) <http://insidetv.ew.com/2013/03/31/hbo-thrones-piracy/>. 
94  ‘[S]ome people still feel that they should be entitled to take this show for free without the consent of its 
creators’: Meagher, above n 77. 
95 Bleich, above n 3. 
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that’s like ‘like justifying stealing a Ferrari on the basis that the waiting list is too 
long or the price is too high’.96 This strong reliance on the rhetoric of property 
rights serves an important political purpose in establishing an ongoing crisis and 
justifying calls for harsher punishments and increased powers of enforcement for 
copyright.97  But it also reflects a key divergence between the way in which 
representatives of the copyright industry portray the effects of infringement and 
the way in which consumers evaluate these effects. The industry’s ‘stealing’ 
rhetoric has been effective to an extent – our data reflects the notion that 
consumers do internalise the wrongfulness of infringement – but it is 
simultaneously undermined by the perceived unfairness of restricted access and 
the false equivocation of every download with a lost sale.  
It is likely that many consumers are aware that the intangible nature of digital 
downloads means that illicit copies do not always result in a direct cost to 
rightsholders (or their incentives to produce more content). Unlike stealing a 
Ferrari, failure to pay for digital content can more easily be dismissed as 
generally harmless or victimless.98 Consumers clearly do not always internalise a 
categorical 99  requirement to always pay for digital content, although recent 
research shows that consumers do often pay for content even when they are not 
required to.100 A large proportion of consumers appear to be highly attuned to 
fairness, and are often motivated to support the producers of creative content that 
they consume, particularly when they feel a strong connection to the artist or 
franchise.101 As a result, consumers appear to have a much more nuanced view of 
the obligation to pay for access than they are typically credited with. 102 Our study 
demonstrates some of this nuance; respondents were clearly aware that copyright 
                                                 
96 Meagher, above n 77. 
97  Cohen, ‘Pervasively Distributed Copyright Enforcement’, above n 5. 
98  This can be explained to a large extent by the cost structure of digital content distribution. Consumers 
generally assume that failing to pay for an information product, which typically has a low variable cost, 
high fixed cost structure, will inflict less harm than failing to pay for a conventional product, which 
typically has a high variable cost, low fixed cost structure: Joseph C Nunes, Christopher K Hsee and Elke 
U Weber, ‘Why Are People So Prone to Steal Software? The Effect of Cost Structure on Consumer 
Purchase and Payment Intentions’ (2004) 23 Journal of Public Policy & Marketing 43, 43. It is also easy 
for some consumers to consider their actions to cause no harm where the victim is ‘unknown’ or 
‘physically absent’: see Gresham M Sykes and David Matza, ‘Techniques of Neutralization: A Theory of 
Delinquency’ (1957) 22 American Sociological Review 664, 668; O Freestone and V-W Mitchell, 
‘Generation Y Attitudes towards E-Ethics and Internet-Related Misbehaviours’ (2004) 54 Journal of 
Business Ethics 121, 126. 
99   Immanuel Kant’s categorical imperative requires people to ‘[a]ct only according to that maxim whereby 
you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law’: Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for 
the Metaphysics of Morals (Allen W Wood trans, Yale University Press, 2002) [trans of: Grundlegung 
zur Metaphysik der Sitten (first published 1785)]. 
100   Belsky reports findings from studies of ‘pay-what-you-want’ schemes that show a surprisingly high level 
of contribution from consumers: Leah Belsky et al, ‘Everything in Its Right Place: Social Cooperation 
and Artist Compensation’ (2010) 17 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review 1, 63. 
101  Suzor, above n 14, 153–6. 
102  Garon argues that ‘[t]he perception that either file sharing of copyrighted material or plagiarism is treated 
differently than physical theft may be more imagined than real’: Jon M Garon, ‘Normative Copyright: A 
Conceptual Framework for Copyright Philosophy and Ethics’ (2003) 88 Cornell Law Review 1278, 1292. 
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infringement is unlawful, but they sometimes equated this with ‘technical’, rather 
than ‘moral’ wrongfulness: 
I’m trying to find out what happened off this particular TV show, what was the 
outcome, who won the whatever it was or something, right, so you can search on 
the internet, find somebody illegally has taped and posted that show, I’m not 
trying to make any profit out of it, I’m not trying to benefit in any way, apart from 
gaining the knowledge of [who won]. And so I guess, in my mind, I’m 
rationalising and saying even though to actually download this show is 
technically, according to our law, it’s illegal, I’m not directly harming anybody, 
my behaviour is not impacting on anybody else. So I guess in my mind I’m 
rationalising that and saying therefore, I think that that’s acceptable. (#7) 
Some respondents appear to take the view that while creators generally 
deserve to get paid for their work, those creators who choose not to actually meet 
market demand lose some of that moral entitlement: ‘[w]e should be allowed to 
access it [content] anyhow, and if they’re not going to let us access it you’re 
going to go round and find another port of entry to get it.’ (#29) This sentiment 
shows a potentially substantial mismatch between consumers’ nuanced 
perceptions of fairness and the rhetoric of the copyright industry and of policy 
makers. Former United States Ambassador Jeffrey Bleich, for example, rejects 
any justification for copyright infringement: 
I realize that fans of Game of Thrones who have used illegal file-sharing sites 
have reasons. They will say it was much easier to access through these sites, or 
that they got frustrated by the delay in the first season, or their parents wouldn’t 
pay for a subscription, or they will complain about some other issue with 
copyright laws. But none of those reasons is an excuse – stealing is stealing.103 
This hardline approach simply does not reflect consumer experience and 
expectations of copyright. In our interviews, respondents were presented with 
hypothetical scenarios in which a third party said they were going to engage in 
infringing behaviour. In order to obtain greater insight into how consumers 
justified perceived questionable and unacceptable behaviours, 104  one of the 
authors asked respondents ‘what would you say to encourage someone to 
illegally download?’. While respondents differed substantially in their ability to 
justify the behaviour,105 there was a clear sense that if rightsholders failed to 
                                                 
103 Bleich, above n 3. 
104  Respondents were presented with hypothetical scenarios in which a person ‘Sam’ or ‘Alex’ said they 
were going to engage in a behaviour selected by the interviewer. Gender-neutral names were used to 
avoid any gender biases. The respondent needed to (1) encourage ‘Sam’ to engage in the behaviour and 
then (2) deter ‘Sam’ from engaging in it. Using a third person technique allowed the respondent to 
transfer his or her own attitudes towards the third person to explain that person’s behaviour: Zikmund et 
al, above n 36. 
105  This variation in individuals’ abilities to justify deviant consumer behaviour reflects past research: see, 
eg, James R Detert, Linda Klebe Treviño and Vicki L Sweitzer, ‘Moral Disengagement in Ethical 
Decision Making: A Study of Antecedents and Outcomes’ (2008) 93 Journal of Applied Psychology 
374; M K Duffy et al, ‘Moral Disengagement and Social Identification: When Does Being Similar Result 
in Harm Doing?’ (Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management, Honolulu, 
August 2005); Brent McFerran, Karl Aquino and Michelle Duffy, ‘How Personality and Moral Identity 
Relate to Individuals’ Ethical Ideology’ (2010) 20 Business Ethics Quarterly 35. 
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make content available to satisfy consumer demand, they were in an important 
sense responsible for infringement: ‘I’d tell them to do it because it’s up to the 
company to make it available, if it’s not available then you know you’ve got a 
right to download it, it’s their problem.’ (#1) 
Ultimately, while some consumers do often accept the moral weight of 
copyright infringement and the ‘stealing’ language of the industry, they are often 
also able to balance that harm against their perceptions of the fairness of industry 
practices.106 ‘Fairness’, as it is understood in consumer copyright markets, may 
be better thought of as a reciprocal relationship: it requires not just that 
consumers pay creators, but that creators provide legitimate means of access. 
This suggests that the key to ensuring that copyright business models are 
sustainable may lie in encouraging infringing audiences to become paying 
consumers, and not necessarily in decreasing infringement in itself. In the next 
section, we suggest that an important part of the solution requires providing 
consumers with the ability to pay for access, given that many frequently express 
a desire to do so. 
 
C    Behavioural Alternatives: Consumers Prefer to Pay 
One of the most interesting themes to emerge from our research is that faced 
with access barriers, consumers will often seek to circumvent those barriers in 
order to pay for access. When content is made available to consumers in other 
markets but not locally, it is possible for Australians to use technical tools like 
Virtual Private Networks or proxy servers to engage in their own domestic 
arbitrage.107 The consumers we spoke to generally thought it was more morally 
acceptable to use these tools than to infringe and avoid paying. As these tools 
become easier to use, their reach begins to extend beyond the technically 
sophisticated into the mainstream. This expansion is facilitated by consumer 
advocates like CHOICE, who have released guides explaining how consumers 
can circumvent ‘geoblocking’ to access television shows, software, games, and 
physical products not available in Australia.108 The IT Pricing Inquiry explicitly 
recommended that education campaigns be introduced to explain to consumers 
how they can circumvent geographical restrictions. 109  Many Australian 
consumers have apparently already taken this advice in order to bypass regional 
pricing or market segmentation. For example, despite the fact that Netflix does 
not currently officially operate in the Australian market, recent reports suggest 
                                                 
106  ‘With regard to digital media, there is some evidence that pirates perceive the prices for digital goods to 
be high, and view this as inequitable, particularly given the economic success of some of the copyright 
holders. Pirates use this disparity to justify their illegal behaviour’: Charles WL Hill, ‘Digital Piracy: 
Causes, Consequences, and Strategic Responses’ (2007) 24 Asia Pacific Journal of Management 9, 12. 
107 IT Pricing Inquiry, above n 9, 102–3 [4.62]–[4.63]. 
108   Elise Dalley, Navigating Online Geo-blocking (5 March 2014) CHOICE Online 
 <http://www.choice.com.au/reviews-and-tests/computers-and-online/networking-and-internet/shopping-
online/navigating-online-geoblocks/page.aspx>. 
109  IT Pricing Inquiry, above n 9, 108 (Recommendation 6). 
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that it may now have more than 50 000 Australian subscribers.110 This has led to 
scathing criticism by Australian streaming firms, like Quickflix, that Netflix is 
able to sell streaming services into the Australian market without having to pay 
rightsholders for access.111 
It is not clearly illegal for Australian consumers to circumvent these technical 
‘geoblocks’ that are put in place to enforce geographic market segmentation.112 
The act of circumventing the geoblocks is unlikely to itself be prohibited by anti-
circumvention legislation, although there is some uncertainty. 113  Since the 
foreign service provider may not have the rights to sell access to the Australian 
market, however, receiving those works might be an infringement of 
copyright.114 
Our research focused on the circumvention of geoblocks in Apple’s iTunes 
store. By signing up for a US-based account, Australians can gain access to 
television shows, movies, and music that is either not available or more 
expensive in Australia as if they were in the US. Especially where circumventing 
geoblocks is relatively easy, consumers likely view it as more morally legitimate 
than downloading content through illicit channels. This seems to reflect a 
willingness on the part of Australian consumers to pay for content, if it is made 
available. Respondents expressed a strong perception that circumventing 
geoblocks when content was not accessible was not morally wrongful: 
I know a lot of people who have done that [creating a fake US iTunes account] 
and I think that’s fine because even though you’re lying, you’re not stealing 
anything and it’s – you can’t actually buy it here. If you had the option to buy it 
here, even if it was a little more expensive, I would say that’s the right thing to do, 
but seeing as they haven’t made the option available I see that as acceptable. (#5) 
The willingness of consumers to seek deviant alternatives to achieving their 
goals is well documented in criminological theory.115 When an individual fails to 
                                                 
110 Michael Bodey, ‘More Netflix Pirates on Board’, The Australian (online), 3 March 2014 
<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/media/broadcast/more-netflix-pirates-on-board/story-fna045gd-
1226842998214#>. 
111 Paul Smith and Max Mason, ‘Quickflix Chief Hits out at Netflix’s Aussie Free Ride in TV Streaming 
Battle’, Australian Financial Review (online), 4 March 2014 <http://www.afr.com/p/technology/ 
 quickflix_chief_hits_out_streaming_MPpkVja74SNNI3iM0SbcQM>. 
112    IT Pricing Inquiry, above n 9, 105–6 [4.71]–[4.76]. 
113   Either because a basic measure like an address check does not amount to an ‘access control technological 
protection measure’ because measures that control geographic market segmentation and restrict playback 
of legitimately acquired foreign content are excluded from the definition under s 10(1) of the Copyright 
Act 1968 (Cth), or because the law is likely to be read down to not overly burden the ability of consumers 
to engage in arbitrage following the High Court’s decision in Stevens v Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer 
Entertainment (2005) 224 CLR 193. See also IT Pricing Inquiry, above n 9, 105–6 [4.71]–[4.76]. 
114   Where Australians download copies of content without the authorisation of the copyright owner, they are 
likely to infringe on the right to make a copy or reproduce the copyright work under ss 31, 85 and 86 of 
the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). When streaming from a foreign provider, they are not likely to infringe the 
right of communication, which means ‘to make available online or electronically transmit’ under s 10(1), 
but they may be liable for the incidental copies that are made in temporary or permanent storage on their 
devices as a process of receiving the stream in accordance with s 43A. 
115  See Robert Agnew, ‘Foundation for a General Strain Theory of Crime and Delinquency’ (1992) 30 
Criminology 47. 
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access content via conventional means, they may perceive their main alternatives 
to be to either circumvent geographical restrictions and pay for content or to seek 
out the material from file-sharing networks. The fact that the first alternative 
mimics a normal business transaction leads consumers to perceive the behaviour 
to be more acceptable than illegal downloading content, as we see one 
respondent explain: ‘I figured at the end of the day you’re still paying for it. … 
You are actually paying for the content so that’s probably why I classified it [as] 
acceptable.’ (#9) 
In our study, respondents drew a moral distinction between paying and not 
paying for content: 
I suppose it’s [creating a fake U.S. iTunes account] generally not really piracy 
because you are still paying for the content anyway, if it was piracy like illegally 
downloading then it would definitely be unacceptable behaviour but … you’re still 
paying for it. … I suppose in some way you might feel awkward about doing it, 
but not really, because you’re still paying for it. (#16) 
These sentiments suggest strongly that the historical geographic segmentation 
of copyright interests, designed to maximise global exploitation, no longer makes 
sense to consumers in a globalised economy. From the perspective of consumers, 
the geographical segmentation of rights appears to ‘[ignore] the possibilities 
afforded by networks and technologies in the twenty-first century’.116 Even actors 
in Game of Thrones describe the industry’s distribution models as ‘archaic’.117 
Respondents seemed well aware that sellers of physical goods do not generally 
have the right to prevent arbitrage; in the shift to digital, the ability of copyright 
owners to control regional pricing seems to be an anomaly: ‘[i]f you just create 
one for the US account, then that’s okay, ‘cause you’re just buying one from that 
site, it’s like importing something from overseas.’ (#10) 
Ultimately, respondents express frustration and a sense that it is not 
legitimate for rightsholders to under serve the Australian market, particularly 
when they are willing to pay for access: 
Why does it matter if I’m an Australian viewing it through a US account? At the 
end of the day I’m still the same person as a counterpart in America. It shouldn’t 
matter based on stupid ideas by the companies when and how they should release 
their videos. They’re providing a service or they’re providing a product. I’m 
paying for it. Why is my Australian dollar any different from a US dollar? It’s 
money that’s what they want. Well if you’re not going to provide service I’m 
going to go take a different route to get something I want. (#3) 
One of the more surprising themes to emerge from this data is that consumers 
often want to be able to pay for access to content. This sentiment seems to be 
spreading amongst consumers in mainstream discourse. Discussion threads about 
                                                 
116  Leaver, above n 8, 150. 
117  See, eg, Meares, quoting Finn Jones, an actor in Game Of Thrones, talking while on tour in Australia, 
who says ‘[t]he way we distribute entertainment at the moment is quite archaic’: Joel Meares, ‘Game of 
Thrones Star Criticises “Archaic” Foxtel Distribution Deal’, The Sydney Morning Herald (online), 6 
April 2014 <http://www.smh.com.au/entertainment/tv-and-radio/game-of-thrones-star-criticises-archaic-
foxtel-distribution-deal-20140405-365pb.html>. 
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regional pricing or geoblocking on forums, news articles, and blog posts are full 
of statements by consumers imploring rightsholders to ‘take my money’. In the 
US, an increasingly vocal group of consumers, known as ‘cordcutters’, are 
campaigning for networks to untie content from cable offerings and provide 
‘legal, reasonably priced options’118 for online distribution. A recent social media 
campaign, ‘Take My Money, HBO!’, saw over 163 000 people in 48 hours ask 
HBO to provide options to access Game of Thrones and similar shows without 
subscribing to a bundled cable service.119 Some of our respondents explained that 
they wanted to pay for access but also wanted access immediately. When they 
were unable to circumvent restrictions and resort to illicit downloads, some 
respondents suggested a rectification process of downloading now and buying 
later in an attempt to mitigate any potential harm caused from infringement: 
If you’re not going to be able to view it within the next couple of days in a 
platform that’s suitable to you, by all means just go download it and if you really 
like it, well, buy it on iTunes when it gets there so, you know, you’re not really 
depriving anyone there. It’s quick and easy to do within two or three clicks you’ve 
downloaded an entire TV show. (#3) 
It has become more common to see claims that increasing consumer choice 
and competition in legitimate channels for access decreases infringement, 120 
although solid empirical data on illicit downloading is still hard to collect. Steam, 
the online computer game distribution platform created by Valve, appears to have 
a marked effect on reducing infringement by enabling consumers to conveniently 
purchase games at reasonable prices.121 The little evidence we do have suggests 
that both iTunes and Spotify122 appear to have had similar effects in the music 
industry. 123  When Netflix took the unprecedented move to produce its own 
                                                 
118  See, eg, Cordcutters Community (2014) Reddit <http://www.reddit.com/r/Cordcutters>.  
119  Jake Caputo, It’s Happening (2014) Take My Money, HBO! <http://takemymoneyhbo.com/>. 
120   See, eg, Glyn Moody, ‘Two New Reports Confirm: Best Way to Reduce Piracy Dramatically Is to Offer 
Good Legal Alternatives’ on TechDirt (25 July 2013) <https://www.techdirt.com/blog/innovation/ 
 articles/20130723/12235723906/two-new-reports-confirm-best-way-to-reduce-piracy-dramatically-is-to-
offer-good-legal-alternatives.shtml>. 
121  Holm argues that ‘Steam’s success in attracting people away from piracy comes from multiple factors, 
but it seems likely that [its] low price, high convenience strategy plays a role’: see Peter Holm, ‘Piracy on 
the Simulated Seas: The Computer Games Industry’s Non-legal Approaches to Fighting Illegal 
Downloads of Games’ (2014) 23 Information & Communications Technology Law 61, 72. 
122  Spotify, ‘Adventures in the Netherlands: New Spotify Study Sees Encouraging Downward Trend in 
Music Piracy in the Netherlands’ (Media Release, 17 July 2013) 
<http://press.spotify.com/us/2013/07/17/adventures-in-netherlands/>. See also David Von Wiegandt, 
‘Spotify: Incentivizing Album Creation Through “The Facebook” of Music’ (2013) 2 Berkeley Journal of 
Entertainment and Sports Law 180, 190–2; Ernesto, ‘Music Piracy Continues to Decline Thanks to 
Spotify’ on TorrentFreak (28 September 2011) <https://torrentfreak.com/music-piracy-continues-to-
decline-thanks-to-spotify-110928/>. 
123   See Braxton, above n 49, 206–8; Joel Waldfogel, ‘Music File Sharing and Sales Displacement in the 
iTunes Era’ (2010) 22 Information Economics and Policy 306; Joel Waldfogel, ‘Copyright Protection, 
Technological Change, and the Quality of New Products: Evidence from Recorded Music Since Napster’ 
(Working Paper No 17503, The National Bureau of Economic Research, October 2011); Joel Waldfogel, 
‘Music Piracy and Its Effects on Demand, Supply, and Welfare’ in Josh Lerner and Scott Stern (eds) 
Innovation Policy and the Economy (University of Chicago Press, 2012) vol 12, 91. 
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television series and make them available for streaming immediately, for a flat 
monthly subscription fee, anecdotal evidence suggests that rates of infringement 
were far lower than those for conventional distribution models. 124  Some 
quantitative data from the US shows that iTunes also displaces illicit file-sharing 
for television content. When the NBC television network removed content from 
iTunes, the number of downloads of those shows via BitTorrent increased by 
11.4 per cent (approximately 48 000 downloads a day).125 This seems to support 
the hypothesis that consumers will choose to pay for digital downloads of 
copyright goods that are reasonably priced and convenient and that, as a result, it 
is possible to ‘compete with free’.126 Our data provides a qualitative illustration 
of this effect, as legitimate channels become cheaper and more convenient to 
access: 
If there’s a legal, a legal alternative that’s available, reasonably priced, then happy 
to do that. Um, movies is a classical example, um, for me personally, I guess, five 
years ago I can remember going to the video store, hiring DVDs or CD – [n]o, it 
would have been DVD movies, and burning copies of those DVD movies. I 
certainly haven’t bothered or haven’t tried to burn one for quite a long time now. 
It’s just not worth my time to be able to do it, movies are readily available online. 
We’ve got, um, you know, Big Pond movies, and also running with the 
subscription to Quick Flicks [sic], so that we can watch a whole lot of movies 
online at what I guess we’ve rationalised at a reasonable price, and the 
convenience factor and anything that goes with that and knowing that we’re doing 
it legally, has meant that we’ve stopped that what was once an illegal practice and 
still is an illegal practice. (#8)  
Many rightsholders are moving to satisfy consumer demand for choice and 
reasonably priced, convenient, digital distribution channels. If it is accepted that 
many consumers seem to view paying for access as morally better than illicitly 
downloading, we expect that enhancing competition in copyright markets for 
digital distribution would be likely to have some effect on reducing rates of 
infringement. Quantifying this effect is likely to be difficult, since a consumer’s 
perception of fairness is likely to depend upon a large range of different factors 
and vary significantly between individuals. More research is likely required, but 
also more experimentation from rightsholders with new digital distribution 
models with different price points and feature sets. 
Importantly, however, the interests of rightsholders are not always aligned 
with those of consumers. Even if satisfying consumer demand is likely to reduce 
infringement, it is not necessarily the profit maximising strategy. For premium 
                                                 
124  Alexis Kleinman, ‘Few People Are Pirating “Arrested Development” Because Netflix Is Affordable 
Enough Already’ on Huffington Post (29 May 2013) <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/29/ 
 pirating-arrested-development_n_3353465.html>. 
125   Brett Danaher et al, ‘Converting Pirates Without Cannibalizing Purchasers: The Impact of Digital 
Distribution on Physical Sales and Internet Piracy’ (2010) 29 Marketing Science 1138, 1149. 
126  See Mark A Lemley, ‘Is the Sky Falling on the Content Industries’ (2011) 9 Journal of 
Telecommunications and High Technology Law 125, 125. Lemley argues throughout his article that 
copyright industries have a long history of adapting to technological changes that have disrupted existing 
business models and made new ones possible. 
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offerings, rightsholders sometimes choose to maximise revenue through 
exclusive licensing of premium content, even if this leads to an increase in illicit 
infringement for the less wealthy or less engaged end of the audience. Time 
Warner and HBO’s strategy with Game of Thrones provides an excellent 
example of a case in which rightsholders prefer to maintain exclusivity, despite 
high rates of infringement, in order to increase or maintain demand for bundled 
cable offerings.127 This business decision leads back to the conflict at the core of 
copyright policy making: to what extent should the law support rightsholders 
decisions not to serve a market – and how can copyright effectively balance 
consumer welfare against the need to secure revenue streams for producers? In 
the next section, we examine two different responses to copyright infringement: 
increasing competition and making legitimate markets more accessible and 
increasing deterrence through enforcement and more punitive sanctions. 
 
V    A LEGISLATIVE OR MARKET-BASED RESPONSE? 
Australia’s Attorney General, Senator George Brandis, has pledged to ‘do 
something’ about Australia’s reputation as ‘the worst offender anywhere in the 
world when it comes to piracy’. 128  In July 2014, the Attorney General’s 
Department and the Department of Communications released a discussion paper 
that suggested sweeping changes to Australia’s copyright laws to require 
intermediaries to do more to combat copyright infringement. 129  While what 
exactly this might entail is not yet clear, the current political debate revolves 
around ‘graduated response schemes’, which would require ISPs to take some 
action to forward on allegations of infringement and, potentially, impose a series 
of technical sanctions on users alleged to have infringed copyright on multiple 
occasions.130 In this Part, we consider the interrelation between legal deterrence 
and social norms. While the lack of legal sanctions increases consumers’ 
willingness to infringe, increasing legal sanctions without changing social norms 
is not likely to be very effective. Conversely, however, increasing legal sanctions 
without enhancing access to legitimate copyright markets is only likely to 
increase consumers’ perceptions of the unfairness of copyright law and industry 
                                                 
127  Unbundling HBO would ‘[make] no sense’ until the relative size of cable subscribers to households with 
broadband but no cable increased significantly: The Economist, ‘The Winning Streak’, The Economist 
(online), 20 August 2011 <http://www.economist.com/node/21526314>. 
HBO’s President, Erik Kain, explains that HBO’s cable affiliates bear most of its marketing and 
distribution costs and that losing exclusive deals with cable companies in favour of direct internet 
subscriptions ‘would be a net loss. … Our content [is] exclusive. It’s the only place you can get it. And 
we believe there is value in exclusivity:’ Erik Kain, quoted in Dustin Curtis, ‘Why HBO’s President 
Panned Internet Streaming’, Dustin Curtis (10 May 2012) <http://dcurt.is/hbo-forbes-journalism>. 
128  Josh Taylor, ‘Australian Government Considers Graduated Response to Piracy’ on ZDNet (28 May 2014) 
<http://www.zdnet.com/au/australian-government-considers-graduated-response-to-piracy-
7000029968/>. 
129  Attorney-General’s Department and Department of Communications, above n 65. 
130 See Rebecca Giblin, ‘Was the High Court in iiNet Right to Be Chary of a Common Law Graduated 
Response?’ (2013) 18 Media and Arts Law Review 283. 
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practices. We argue that aligning social norms and copyright law likely requires 
meeting consumer demand for choice and competition in digital distribution 
models. 
 
A    Increasing Legal Sanctions 
Accessibility is not the only driver of infringement. Unsurprisingly, 
consumers often explain that copyright law provides little legal deterrent to 
restrain their behaviour. The music industry learned in the early 2000s that suing 
their fan base was a terrible public relations strategy,131 and relatively few direct 
suits against consumers of mainstream media content have been filed worldwide 
since then. This lack of effective deterrence means that the perceived legal risk of 
infringement remains low among consumers, as one respondent points out: ‘[t]he 
chance of being caught I would think is quite small so the risk of detection would 
be small.’ (#14)  Similar sentiments were common throughout the interview 
sample. Consumers can perceive some moral weight of copyright, but discount 
the threat of legal sanctions: ‘[e]ven though technically you are stealing it, well, 
breach of copyright, but chances of you getting caught are nil so to most people 
that’s probably why most people do it.’ (#23) 
Graduated response schemes are the logical next step in increasing deterrence 
in copyright enforcement. Rightsholders are keen to avoid the high costs and bad 
publicity of legal enforcement by staying out of the judicial system and requiring 
private intermediaries to enforce their rights instead.132 This leads to a severe 
threat for legitimacy and due process, particularly where ISPs are being asked to 
impose substantial penalties on consumers without judicial oversight. 133  This 
concern has forced rightsholders to step back from schemes that would require 
ISPs to disconnect users from the internet completely, following strong activism 
around the world and a successful and high profile challenge on constitutional 
grounds in France.134 Current lobbying efforts for new enforcement measures 
generally focus on notice based regimes as a first step. 135  The schemes are 
                                                 
131 Peter K Yu, ‘The Copyright Divide’ (2003) 25 Cardozo Law Review 331, 442–3; Peter K Yu, ‘P2P and 
the Future of Private Copying’ (2005) 76 University of Colorado Law Review 653, 660, 665; Kristina 
Groennings, ‘Costs and Benefits of the Recording Industry’s Litigation against Individuals’ (2005) 20 
Berkeley Technology Law Journal 571, 589–91. 
132  For a comprehensive overview of graduated response schemes around the world, see Rebecca Giblin, 
‘Evaluating Graduated Response’ (2014) 37 Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts 147. 
133 See Nicolas Suzor and Brian Fitzgerald, ‘The Legitimacy of Graduated Response Schemes in Copyright 
Law’ (2011) 34 University of New South Wales Law Journal 1. 
134  Conseil constitutionnel [French Constitutional Court], decision n° 2009-580 DC, 10 June 2009 reported 
in JO, 13 June 2009. 
135 The Government’s July 2014 proposal explicitly did not envisage requiring internet service providers to 
disconnect users who received multiple allegations of infringement, but any increased liability could 
force service providers to rely on the ‘Safe Harbours’ in s 116AH(1) of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), 
which do include an obligation to terminate the accounts of ‘repeat infringers’. Even if a notice-based 
scheme were introduced, there is some likelihood that if sanctions are not imposed, subscribers who 
receive notices will quickly learn that no consequences usually follow. In this case, it seems highly likely 
that any drop in infringement due to ‘warning’ or ‘education’ notices would be temporary at best, and 
pressure on the Government and on private entities to introduce sanctions would be likely to follow. 
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framed as primarily educational, not punitive, and the imposition of ‘technical’ 
sanctions is generally left as an open possibility once the infrastructure is in 
place. Most recently, in the US, rightsholders and ISPs have established a private 
scheme that is designed primarily to ‘educate’ or ‘warn’ consumers, rather than 
require disconnection, although there is a vaguely worded requirement to impose 
a ‘mitigation measure’ on the fifth or sixth notice.136  
Australian rightsholders are apparently not lobbying for a disconnection 
scheme, but are actively pushing for a scheme that would see ISPs warn users 
and then slow down their internet access.137 The most recent push comes after the 
High Court in Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v iiNet Ltd138 held that a general purpose 
ISP was not liable for the infringing actions of its users and was under no 
obligation to pass on allegations of infringement or enforce the rights of third 
parties. Before the iiNet, Australian ISPs seemed ready to back a notice based 
scheme that would allow rightsholders to discover the details of users who had 
received more than four ‘education’ and ‘warning’ notices.139 Following iiNet, 
ISPs have less incentive to negotiate with rightsholders, but the possibility that a 
formal regulatory system may be introduced has led ISPs to note that they are 
willing to ‘re-engage in the debate’. 140  The Government’s proposal would 
essentially overturn iiNet in order to provide ISPs with an incentive to reach a 
negotiated agreement with rightsholders.141 Two major points of disagreement 
remain: ISPs would prefer that rightsholders bear the costs of administering the 
scheme, and that any sanctions were only imposed through a valid judicial 
process.142 
Whether additional enforcement mechanisms should be introduced remains 
an open question. While the lack of effective deterrence contributes to consumer 
                                                 
136  ‘Mitigation measures’ might include a restriction in speed, mandatory education programs, suspension of 
service, or other measures at the ISP’s discretion: see Annemarie Bridy, ‘Graduated Response American 
Style: Six Strikes Measured against Five Norms’ (2012) 23 Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & 
Entertainment Law Journal 1, 32–3. 
137  Mahesh Sharma and Ben Grubb, ‘World’s Worst Pirates and Their Parents Face Walking the Plank’, The 
Sydney Morning Herald (online), 13 June 2014 <http://www.smh.com.au/digital-life/digital-life-
news/worlds-worst-pirates-and-their-parents-face-walking-the-plank-20140613-zs5pb.html>. 
138  (2012) 248 CLR 42 (‘iiNet’). 
139  Communications Alliance Ltd, ‘Australian Internet Service Provider (ISP) Proposal: A Scheme to 
Address Online Copyright Infringement’ (2011). See also Suzanne Tindal, ‘ISPs Propose Copyright-
Notice Scheme’ on ZDNet (25 November 2011) <http://www.zdnet.com/isps-propose-copyright-notice-
scheme-1339326850/>. iiNet later publicly withdrew support for the scheme: Renai LeMay, ‘iiNet Pulls 
out of Anti-Piracy Scheme’ on Delimiter (10 December 2012) <http://delimiter.com.au/2012/12/10/iinet-
pulls-out-of-anti-piracy-scheme/>. 
140  Josh Taylor, ‘Costs Must Be Fixed First in Piracy Solution: Comms Alliance’ on ZDNet (9 April 2014) 
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motivations to infringe copyright, it is not clear that graduated response schemes 
are actually likely to reduce infringement. The evidence so far is inconclusive at 
best.143 These schemes are only likely to be effective to the extent that they are 
able to substantially reduce the temporal distance between the time a consumer 
infringes copyright and the time the punishment is imposed.144 Moreover, the 
probability of punishment, severity of punishment, and swiftness of punishment 
must all be high for the consumer to perceive infringement to be a high risk.145 In 
short, changing consumer understandings of acceptable behaviour through 
deterrence is difficult, and likely requires a strongly punitive regime. 
 
B    The Social Legitimacy of Copyright Law: Changing Social Norms  
and Changing Business Models 
Infringing behaviour must always be understood in its social context. The 
effectiveness of copyright law depends not only (or perhaps not even primarily) 
on legal sanctions, but on how infringement is socially constructed and 
perceived.146 Our research highlights a growing risk that copyright is losing its 
normative legitimacy. One of the authors asked the subjects: ‘if you heard of, or 
observed someone infringing, would you have a reaction?’. The response was a 
resounding ‘no’ from consumers interviewed. This supports the common 
intuition that there are few, if any, social sanctions against copyright 
infringement. The lack of either formal or informal sanctions suggests that 
infringing behaviour is normatively acceptable, as articulated by a respondent in 
our interviews: ‘[w]ell I think most people would class it as acceptable, even 
though it’s illegal … I think it’s just become the norm. I think even across most 
generations people are downloading stuff off the net.’ (#23) 
This demonstrated lack of acceptance of the legitimacy of copyright law 
should be extremely worrying. Without support from informal social norms, 
                                                 
143  See Giblin, above n 132, 182–95. Giblin reviewed the empirical data developed so far and concluded that 
‘the evidence that graduated response actually reduces infringement is extraordinarily thin’: at 195. 
144  See Don A Moore and George Loewenstein, ‘Self-interest, Automaticity, and the Psychology of Conflict 
of Interest’ (2004) 17 Social Justice Research 189. 
145  See Harold G Grasmick and Donald E Green, ‘Legal Punishment, Social Disapproval and Internalization 
as Inhibitors of Illegal Behavior’ (1980) 71 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 325. 
146  For example, Gunter found that ‘college students with peers engaging in piracy and parents supportive of 
piracy were more likely to engage in piracy themselves’: Whitney Gunter, ‘Piracy on the High Speeds: A 
Test of Social Learning Theory on Digital Piracy among College Students’ (2008) 3 International 
Journal of Criminal Justice Sciences 54, 65. Higgins, Fell and Wilson found that students who associate 
with peers who infringe copyright are more likely to infringe themselves: George E Higgins, Brian D Fell 
and Abby L Wilson, ‘Low Self-control and Social Learning in Understanding Students’ Intentions to 
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copyright is unlikely to be respected or obeyed. 147  The inconsistencies in 
opinions on infringement suggest a lack of social consensus as to whether 
infringement is inherently wrongful. Consumers do at times internalise the idea 
that infringement is ‘stealing’, but at the same time, the norm against 
infringement is undermined by pervasive and normalised infringement and a 
feeling amongst Australian consumers that they are maltreated by copyright 
business models. When consumers are able to justify their actions by reference to 
the failure of distributors to provide legitimate access in cheap, convenient, and 
fair forms, they will be able to infringe and avoid experiencing any cognitive 
dissonance from their actions.148 Consumers who continue to be excluded, either 
because their demand does not meet the threshold to subscribe to premium 
offerings, or because the material is not available in their region, will likely 
continue to have a strong motivation to infringe. For instance, one respondent 
noted that: ‘[b]uying a DVD as opposed to illegally downloading – it’s expensive 
and I have to wait for so long and I don’t really think that it’s kind of worth it to 
pay for that amount and wait for that long.’ (#24) This is a problem that extends 
beyond any private costs to rightsholders. Ultimately, the legitimacy of the 
copyright system is at stake – the real risk here is that copyright law has become 
ineffective at guiding behaviour.149 
Introducing harsher sanctions might increase legal deterrence, but even with 
severe punishments, social norms may not shift if consumers continue to perceive 
the law or business models to be unfair. As long as access continues to be more 
limited and more expensive in Australia than in comparable countries, consumers 
are likely to continue to blame copyright industries for their infringement. This is 
not a new problem; when Napster was sued in 2000, there were already 
predictions that limiting distribution of content would not be a viable strategy: 
‘[p]iracy is the tool that allows consumers to drive down prices … they’re 
realising they have no power to punish companies for unfair pricing, price fixing 
[and] limited distribution for DVDs.’150 This sentiment that business models need 
to evolve to meet consumer demand is reflected in our data: 
The model for distribution is stuck in the last century, they haven’t really caught 
up with the internet yet … so, that needs to be resolved, and because that sort of 
                                                 
147  Cooter argues that law is most effective when it aligns with social norms: Robert D Cooter, ‘Three 
Effects of Social Norms on Law: Expression, Deterrence, and Internalization’ (2000) 79 Oregon Law 
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consumers’ willingness to infringe copyright in software: Sameer Hinduja, ‘Neutralization Theory and 
Online Software Piracy: An Empirical Analysis’ (2007) 9 Ethics and Information Technology 187, 197. 
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provision of public goods: George Klosko, ‘Presumptive Benefit, Fairness, and Political Obligation’ 
(1987) 16 Philosophy & Public Affairs 241, 247.  
148  Lou Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Stanford University Press, 1962). 
149   Tehranian argues that increasing enforcement of copyright law will ‘[force] us to address the 
uncomfortable and ultimately untenable’ disparity between law and social norms: John Tehranian, 
‘Infringement Nation: Copyright Reform and the Law/Norm Gap’ (2007) (3) Utah Law Review 537, 549. 
150  O Freestone and V-W Mitchell, above n 98, 126, quoting Marilynn Wheeler, ‘Inside the Online Movie 
Underground’ on ZDNet (15 May 2000) <http://www.zdnet.com/inside-the-online-movie-underground-
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business model hasn’t caught up yet with where we’re at, this is why people are 
doing this [illegal downloading]. But this just leads to all of this kerfuffle about 
copyright, and it just entrenches the positions of the big companies against piracy 
and that, so I think it detracts from the broader issue of moving towards a better 
model for everyone. (#27) 
Ultimately, the pressure to increase deterrence in copyright intersects at some 
point with the need to increase access to information and entertainment goods. 
Both the Productivity Commission151  and the Australian Parliament Standing 
Committee on Infrastructure and Communications152 have recently recommended 
taking steps to increase competition and reduce geographic segmentation in 
copyright markets, on both efficiency and consumer welfare grounds. This is a 
direct conflict; enhancing enforcement, to the extent that it is effective, will 
enhance the ability of rightsholders to engage in price discrimination, including 
geographic market segmentation. In cases where the profit maximising strategies 
of copyright industries rely on price discrimination to encourage the most loyal 
audiences to pay for premium offerings, Australian consumers will likely 
continue to suffer from higher prices and less choice and competition in 
distribution channels. While the deadweight loss caused by unmet demand may 
be self-correcting to an extent, the damage to the public’s faith in copyright is 
not. 
This conflict, between enforcement and access, also plays out at the level of 
public policy development.153 While the Attorney-General’s Department appears 
keen to increase the strength of copyright, the Communications Minister, 
Malcolm Turnbull, has expressed strong support for the proposition that 
rightsholders should focus on making content available to consumers: 
Basically you’ve got to recognise that the minute Game of Thrones or any other 
show is put to air, it will be available globally. … So the owners of that copyright 
have got to be in a position where it can be released simultaneously theatrically, or 
in the case of something like that on Pay TV everywhere. But also, it should be for 
sale through the iTunes store or various other platforms at the same time. Because 
if it’s not for sale –because what’s happening is, Game of Thrones, episode three I 
think goes on air this week in Australia. I think it went to air a couple of weeks 
ago in the States. It’s been tweeted and written up and Facebooked endlessly – and 
if they can download, they will. Now we’re just kidding ourselves – all they are 
doing is throwing money away by not making it available instantly.154 
                                                 
151  Productivity Commission, above n 24, discussing the market for books in Australia. 
152  IT Pricing Inquiry, above n 9, discussing pricing for information goods including books, software, music, 
and film products. 
153  Josh Taylor, ‘Turnbull May Soften Brandis’ Hard Line on Copyright Infringement’ on ZDNet (6 June 
2014) <http://www.zdnet.com/turnbull-may-soften-brandis-hard-line-on-copyright-infringement-
7000030281/>. 
154  Renai LeMay, ‘Turnbull on iiTrial: We Need “Global Copyright”’ on Delimiter (26 April 2012) 
<http://delimiter.com.au/2012/04/26/turnbull-on-iitrial-we-need-global-copyright/>, quoting Malcolm 
Turnbull. 
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Certainly, copyright markets in Australia are getting better. Netflix is 
scheduled to launch in Australia in 2015,155 although its available catalogue will 
likely be significantly smaller than in the US, at least initially.156 Major television 
networks have increased the amount of content available on demand and reduced 
the delay in distribution that Australians face.157 On demand streaming services 
have reduced their prices to be more competitive. 158  Television shows are 
increasingly broadcast in Australia within hours of the original broadcast,159 and 
films and computer games now often receive near simultaneous release in 
Australia.160 But this process is by no means complete; there is still a long way to 
go before Australian consumers experience parity of convenience and 
competition for distribution channels in the Australian market, and prices remain 
much higher in Australia.161 
Until distribution models improve and consumers no longer feel maltreated, 
increasing the strength of copyright law risks alienating consumers even further. 
If consumers blame the industry for failing to provide access, increasing the 
severity of punishments without increasing access may lead to consumers to view 
industry practices as increasingly hypocritical. While increased deterrence might 
decrease acts of infringement, it will do so in a way that weakens the social 
norms that underpin copyright.162 Maintaining high levels of legal deterrence will 
also likely require the continuation of an escalating arms race, as consumers seek 
out new methods of escaping detection for file-sharing.163 The logical endgame in 
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this strategy is not attractive; it requires tight control over telecommunications 
networks,164 with significant costs to privacy165 and ‘generativity’,166 as well as 
restricting the flow of information and cultural goods upon which our culture 
depends.167 
VI    CONCLUSION 
A serious disconnect has emerged between industry practices, copyright law, 
and consumer perceptions. Film and television producers have become adept at 
driving up demand by engaging audiences and nurturing the ‘cultural buzz’ that 
surrounds entertainment goods. At the same time, however, many players in the 
copyright industries are actually contributing to undermining copyright norms by 
failing to meet that demand. Our research provides qualitative evidence that 
shows how decisions not to provide access to Australian markets on the same 
terms as in other jurisdictions is seen by consumers to be unfair and increases 
their willingness to infringe copyright. We also show that consumers would often 
rather pay for access than infringe, as long as the material is available in a timely, 
reasonably priced, and convenient manner. 
Particularly for premium offerings, the marketing campaigns of copyright 
industries reflect a much more sophisticated and nuanced understanding of 
copyright than is portrayed by their lobbying arms. The language of the lobbyists 
is one of crisis and ‘theft’, and there is increasing political pressure on the 
Australian government to increase the force of copyright law. These increases are 
likely to come at significant costs, both in increased enforcement costs and less 
measurable costs to due process and privacy. But the actions of the industry, 
occasionally explicitly acknowledged, reflect a markedly different view: 
infringement is not always harmful – it can just be a symptom of demand and 
popularity of a franchise, and it can sometimes actually be an important tool in 
increasing demand. The decision not to provide access to the Australian market is 
sometimes a relic of the historical way in which copyrights were segmented 
along regional lines; at other times, it is part of a deliberate strategy to maximise 
profits through exclusive licensing arrangements. Seen as a whole, the industry’s 
strategy appears to rely on increasing both infringement and the legal sanctions 
on infringement, in order to maximise both the number of people talking about 
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and viewing film and television content and the number of people who choose to 
pay for lucrative premium offerings. 
We think that increasing punishments at this time might actually be 
counterproductive. Increasing enforcement without better serving the Australian 
market is only likely to continue to undermine the moral legitimacy of copyright 
law. 168  Our research highlights the way that poor levels of access can lead 
consumers to blame rightsholders for failing to meet market demand, and this 
encourages a social norm that infringing copyright, while illegal, is not morally 
wrongful. Unless and until this norm changes, increased enforcement is unlikely 
to be very effective. 
Assuming that increasing the deterrence available to rightsholders does 
reduce infringement, it might increase the proportion of users willing to pay for 
premium services. But without increasing access, it is also likely to increase 
deadweight loss – the welfare cost caused by unmet consumer demand. Because 
the incentives of rightsholders and consumers are not fully aligned, increasing the 
amount that rightsholders can charge for premium offerings might actually 
reduce the incentives to provide Australians with better legitimate channels to 
access creative cultural content. At least for premium content, rightsholders have 
so far chosen to maximise profits by focusing on the more lucrative end of the 
market – premium cable subscriptions, expensive digital rentals, and hardcopy 
distribution – at the expense of more affordable options. If enforcement levels are 
increased without measures to enhance competition in distribution channels, 
rational rightsholders will continue to have an incentive to limit access in order to 
push audiences towards more profitable premium services. The result is likely to 
be predictable: faced with an ongoing lack of choice in affordable digital 
distribution models, coupled with an increasingly punitive legal regime, 
Australian consumers will continue to lose respect for copyright law. This is an 
outcome that should be avoided, as it leads only to an ongoing, costly, and 
increasingly punitive enforcement arms race. 
Copyright policy must strike a balance between providing private returns to 
rightsholders and promoting the dissemination of cultural goods. In Australia, 
there is a clear sentiment amongst consumers that this balance has not been met. 
Until distribution channels improve significantly to better meet consumer 
demand, the priority for copyright policy should be to seek to enhance access and 
competition in Australian media markets, rather than seeking to drive change 
through increased enforcement. Ultimately, consumers want access to content 
through legitimate channels in a way that is both convenient and reasonably 
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priced, and they do not want to feel exploited. As long as they are denied access 
on acceptable terms, consumers will seek out other ways to fulfil their demand. If 
rightsholders do choose to provide consumers with access on fair terms, it seems 
clear that many will prefer to pay rather than infringe.  
 
 
